Privatization is an ever more dominant model of economic and social rights (ESR) realization. Thus far, however, there has been relatively little attention paid to privatization in ESR scholarship and practice, resulting in a significant lacuna from both a normative and an empirical perspective. Taking as its starting point the delineation of ESR obligations in terms of the tripartite typology of respect, protect, and fulfill, this article critiques how that framework (and the treaty bodies which employ it in their work) addresses privatization from an ESR perspective. The author outlines a new approach-focused on the obligation to fulfill-which would contribute significantly to the ability of ESR law as it stands to capture and address the scope of state decision-making and (in)action at issue in privatization situations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Privatization is an ever more dominant model of economic and social rights (ESR) realization. Contracting out, public-private partnerships, and other approaches by which the private sector takes responsibility for, or supports the state in, delivering ESR-related goods and services are being advanced aggressively at both the national and supranational levels, with international financial institutions playing an especially influential role. Thus far, however, there has been relatively little attention paid to privatization in ESR scholarship and practice, resulting in a significant lacuna from both a normative and an empirical perspective. This gap is perhaps most striking-and worrying-in relation to the work of those international bodies that are mandated with interpreting and applying the ESR standards under international law.
Taking as its starting point the delineation of ESR obligations in terms of the tripartite typology of respect, protect, and fulfill outlined by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), this article considers how that framework, and the human rights treaty-monitoring bodies which employ it in their work, address privatization from an ESR perspective. Highlighting an excessive emphasis on the obligation to protect to the exclusion of other relevant levels of obligation, the author asserts that such an approach is reflective of a failure to conceptualize privatization and the state's role with regard to such properly-a failure that has very serious implications for the ability of the ESR framework as it stands to capture rights-harming actions in the context of privatization effectively. Arguing for a shift to the obligation to fulfill, the author contends this alternative approach would contribute significantly to the ability of ESR law as it stands to capture-and address-the full scope of state decision-making and (in)action at issue in situations of privatization.
The article opens with a discussion of privatization, its central role in prevailing economic globalization, and its ever more prevalent employment by states to varying degrees in giving effect to ESR in areas such as education, housing, and social security. Having provided a brief overview of the relationship between ESR and privatization in international human rights law (IHRL) terms, it considers how the existing international ESR schema and those who interpret and apply it address privatization. Turning to the tripartite typology, the article assesses how those entities have developed and employed that framework to conceptualize and engage with privatization. It first traces the approach(es) of the UN treaty-monitoring bodies with an ESR mandate, before turning to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' most recent-and detailed-engagement with privatization in its General Comment No. 24 on State Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context of Business Activities. 1 The article does so with the aim of evaluating the extent to which the predominant approach to the typology is capable of fully capturing ESRharming actions in the context of privatization, identifying how this approach can/should be improved upon, and assessing whether in view of General Comment No. 24 the Committee is in fact moving in the right direction.
II. PRIVATIZATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
The last thirty years have seen a massive shift towards a "smaller" or "shrinking" state, with governments ceding a range of functions previously regarded as "public" in nature through "privatization, outsourcing, and load shedding of public responsibilities."
2 Ironically, this notion of the reconfigured state 3 which has largely offloaded operational, if not legal, responsibility in terms of exercising functions related to human rights, has coincided with growing international and comparative recognition of ESR as legal standards imposing binding obligations on states in terms of their realization. Privatization has been justified, indeed, heralded, on a range of instrumental grounds, including "efficiency, competition, innovation and deficit reduction." 4 From an ESR perspective, it is arguable that where privatization results in more resources being available for ESR achievement, 5 or more "expeditious" and "effective" realization of the different elements of ESR 6 through, for instance, the capture of the capacity or expertise of private actors, it might-perhaps even should-be welcomed. It is well beyond the scope of this article to describe the opportunities and risks that all of the myriad models of privatization pose in terms of the myriad elements of (noting that the consequences of the outsourcing of public functions are in fact more to do with the manner and form of public power, rather than with the diminution of its quantum, and that privatization correctly viewed involves a reconfiguration rather than a repudiation of the state ESR. 7 However, the potential of privatization to contribute to "innovations and plural forms of social provision," thereby strengthening the state's "total response to people in need," 8 is one that cannot be lightly dismissed by ESR advocates.
For the purposes of this article, I understand privatization to mean a shift towards provision by nongovernmental or nonstate actors of certain classes of goods and services, or performance by those actors of certain classes of functions, for the provision or performance of which individuals have been accustomed to relying exclusively or mainly on state offices and agencies. 9 Privatization covers a range of models and processes: these range from ownership of assets, purely private models; to models where the state retains ownership but contracts out an institution or delivery of a public service to private actors (i.e., where the operation of an institution or a service is privatized).
10 Different models are used in different places and in different ESR-related sectors.
In her June 2010 report to the Human Rights Council, the then Independent Expert on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Related to Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation expressed a preference for the employment of the term "private sector participation" over "privatization" on the basis that the former term is commonly used to refer to a broad spectrum of contractual arrangements between governments and the private sector that involve private companies in varying degrees in the provision of water and sanitation services. They differ according to the ownership of assets, the responsibility for capital investments, the allocation of risks, the responsibility for operations and maintenance, and the typical contract duration. For instance, while the model of concessions confers the management, risk and responsibility for investment on the private sector, private sector participation can also be limited to contracting out some aspects of management or service provision. In many cases, the system cannot be designated as exclusively public or private but instead takes on a hybrid nature, also in the form of joint ventures. harv. l. rev. 1229, 1230 (2003) . Minow is concerned with ensuring that privatization is subject to adequate public accountability requirements. 9. Adapted from Frank I. Michelman, Constitutionalism, Privatisation and Globalisation:
Whither the Constitution?, 21 carDozo l. rev. 1063, 1063 (2000) . I have replaced "organizations" with "actors" to avoid confusion with a specific kind of nonstate actors: nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 10. This is also known as "contracting out. There is no doubt that a failure to acknowledge the complexity and multiple forms of private sector involvement in the delivery of ESR-related goods and services would render effective rights-based analyses of such forms inadequate. However, "privatization" is the term commonly used when considering the role of the private sector in the delivery of ESR-related services historically delivered by the state. Therefore, this article will employ it, albeit acknowledging that the term is being employed to cover a range of models and processes involving differing roles and levels of involvement for the private sector. This includes situations in which the private actor is a state-owned company with a legal entity distinct from the state. This article will not, however, focus on informal private sector actors who have not been formally mandated by the government to provide services. 12 Nor will it address situations of "implicit privatization" in which privatization of sectors has occurred due to state cessation of public programs and disengagement of government from specific kinds of responsibilities. 13 Finally, and relatedly, this article will not speak directly to situations in which liberalization and/ or deregulation has resulted in increased private actor involvement in ESR realization, 14 where the state has not specifically mandated such involvement. Admittedly, the analysis in the article will certainly have implications for these other forms of privatization to varying degrees but, given my criticisms of the failure of the bodies under consideration in this article to engage effectively with the complexities of privatization, I do not want to make the same mistake myself by employing a "one size fits all (forms of privatization)" model of analysis.
Privatization is frequently identified as a fundamental element of contemporary globalization, specifically neoliberal economic globalization, 15 12. That is not to suggest that this is not a key issue in terms of delivery of some ESR-related services. For a discussion of the role played by this sector in the context of the right to water, see come to be closely associated with a variety of specific trends and policies including an increasing reliance upon the free market, a significant growth in the influence of international financial markets and institutions in determining the viability of national policy priorities, a diminution in the role of the state and the size of its budget, the privatization of various functions previously considered to be the exclusive domain of the state, the deregulation of a range of activities with a and its bedfellow neoliberal economic orthodoxy. 16 It went from being "an iconoclastic policy idea in Margaret Thatcher's 1979 British election manifesto to a major element of economic policy in both developed and developing countries over the course of twenty years."
17 Against the backdrop of, and reflective of, the global diffusion of the political-economic ideology of privatization, 18 the trend towards private sector involvement in areas with implications for human rights has been accelerated by factors including loan conditionality and the policies of international donors, international view to facilitating investment and rewarding individual initiative, and a corresponding increase in the role and even responsibilities attributed to private actors, both in the corporate sector, in particular to the transnational corporations, and in civil society.
CESCR, Rep. on the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Sessions, ¶ 515, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1998/26 (1 Jan. 1999) (emphasis added). See also Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (26 Jan. 1997), ¶ 2, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/48abd5730.html. The Principles highlight that [s] ince the end of the Cold War, there has been a trend in all regions of the world to reduce the role of the state and to rely on the market to resolve problems of human welfare, often in response to conditions generated by international and national financial markets and institutions and in an effort to attract investments from the multinational enterprises whose wealth and power exceed that of many states. It is no longer taken for granted that the realization of economic, social and cultural rights depends significantly on action by the state, although, as a matter of international law, the state remains ultimately responsible for guaranteeing the realization of these rights. 
III. PRIVATIZATION AND IHRL: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
It is well established that privatization is not in and of itself precluded by IHRL. This is unsurprising given the strong role of nonstate actors in ESRrelated goods and services provision at the time of drafting and ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (IC-ESCR) and other treaties containing ESR-for instance, the part played by religious orders and other private actors in education in many countries-and
19. An example of this is what Nicol has described as "the EU's policy of compelling privatisation." Nicol, supra note 4, at 167. According to Nicol:
Article 106 TFEU, relating to the application of EU competition law to public undertakings, has been interpreted by the ECJ as removing the ability of Member States to reserve certain activities to their public sectors. This case-law has subsequently been reinforced and broadened by EU liberalisation directives . . . Such liberalization brings in its wake an inevitable degree of privatisation, since it tends to be the private sector which takes advantage of liberalisation rights. the wide degree of discretion afforded to states in terms of the umbrella obligations imposed by ICESCR and other ESR-containing instruments. 23 Indeed, the existence of private provision of ESR-related goods and services was recognized by the drafters of ICESCR to the extent of that instrument providing that states can only interfere with the liberty of nonstate actors to establish and direct educational institutions in very limited circumstances. 24 As discussed below, the IHRL body with the greatest authority vis-à-vis the interpretation and application of ESR, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, has emphasized that the rights recognized in ICESCR "are susceptible of realization within the context of a wide variety of economic and political systems, 25 that privatization may be one of the "enabling strategies" to be encouraged by states to supply ESR goods and services deficits, 26 and that private provision is very much a feature of the ESR-related goods and service landscape. That said, there has been growing concern globally about the human rights implications of private sector participation in the delivery of services traditionally associated with the state in a range of contexts, including prison operations, 27 social care and child protection, 28 Manfred Nowak is undoubtedly correct in noting that human rights are not "neutral" on privatization on the basis that effective implementation of international human rights obligations requires states and the international community to develop, maintain, and progressively improve a certain level of public infrastructure in order to enable all human beings to effectively enjoy and exercise all human rights. 30 However, given that privatization is permissible in terms of IHRL, this article-which is focused on that body of law-seeks to identify the parameters of rights-compliant privatization, rather than to reject it out of hand as a violation of human rights per se. Privatization can clearly violate ESR in terms of the way in which it is carried out (i.e., through the noncompliance of privatization process with human rights) and in terms of its outcomes (i.e., the impact of privatization on the enjoyment of human rights). 31 While strong views are frequently expressed about certain human rights-related services and functions being fundamentally and inherently governmental or public in nature, 32 such views Nauru 40 International enforcement mechanisms with regard to ESR in a privatization context are similarly predominantly state-focused. Furthermore, even if there was to be a shift toward widespread recognition of direct obligations of nonstate actors under IHRL, states would ultimately still be responsible for ensuring effective remedies; as such, state responsibility will always be in the background.
Id
The fact that the state remains a key player in both enabling and implementing privatization also renders a state-centric focus appropriate: it is important to recognize that privatization cannot occur without state consent, with states taking the necessary action to delegate or divest (albeit that they may not be acting autonomously in exercising a decision to implement such policies). This is reflected in increasingly nuanced understandings of the role of the state in creating and maintaining the public-private divide in the ESR context. For instance, in the UK, food banks which deliver right to food-related goods are private entities (subject to state regulation through, inter alia, charities law and local environmental health regulations). At the same time, most of these private bodies operate on a voucher system, with vouchers being issued by state actors including public health, education, and social workers. 41 As such, while food banks and their activities are officially located in the "private sphere," they are a key means by which public sector actors ensure food access. There is a tendency in the literature to focus on the "weakening state" in the context of economic globalization, and the relative power differences between (particularly poorer) states and nonstate actors such as transnational corporations; in fact, it is arguable that globalization has not resulted in a lack of state power (as Harvey notes, "neoliberalism cannot function without a strong state and strong market and legal institutions") 42 so much as a choice on the part of the state about how and through which intermediaries power should be exercised 43 -as well as for what purposes. It is thus appropriate and important to keep an eye on those choices-and their ESR compliance-rather than focusing exclusively on mechanisms whose current ability to ensure effective accountability in the context of ESR-harming privatization is, at best, open to question. The article thus plays by the rules of IHRL as they stand but fully acknowledges that these rules are under review and indeed strongly merit revision with regard to their effective capture of ESR-affecting private actors.
A final point before we move on: a significant thing to note in relation to the forms of privatization considered in this article is the multiplicity of stages or loci of state decision-making and (in)action that are at issue in any privatization situation. When it comes to decision-making in the context of state divestiture or contracting out of ownership or management-the key forms of privatization under consideration in this article-the state has in human rights terms a role before, during, and after privatization. 44 State decisions and actions prior to privatization include the decision to examine the possibility of privatization, the subsequent move to privatize and the delineation of the privatization model to be adopted in the specific instance (this might include both the specific form that privatization should take and the identification of mechanisms and benchmarks for the assessment of the "success" of privatization). State decision-making actions during privatization will primarily focus on ensuring the implementation of that privatization in line with pre-established plans. The role of the state post-privatization will be primarily one of supervision and regulation: to ensure that private actors conform to their undertakings and functions and to assess the overall 42 success of privatization in terms of pre-determined standards. Any adequate conceptualization of privatization must recognize the existence of these different stages of decision-making and action-and the relevance of ESR and the obligations imposed by such rights to all of them.
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IV. PRIVATIZATION AND ESR OBLIGATIONS
In considering how the rules of IHRL serve to capture and challenge negative privatization-related impacts on ESR, our starting point is the ESR obligations framework; that is, the hard law ESR framework set out in the core UN human rights treaties and its interpretation by the relevant quasi-judicial treaty-monitoring bodies.
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A. Painting a Partial Picture of Obligation: The Work of the CESCR on Privatization
The first-and indeed key-body to consider is the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Committee has not ignored the role of pri-45. It must also of course recognize potential limitations on state capacity in terms of its ability to give effect to its obligations (in terms of effective institutions or available resources, for instance), as well as the roles and responsibilities of other actors in relation to privatization. This paper will not however engage extensively with these issues, reserving them to future work rooted in specific instances of privatization where they can be explored more fully. This paper is focused on the shortcoming in terms of the ESR framework in relation to privatization, rather than the practical challenges faced by states in giving effect to the obligations in terms of that framework. vate actors with regard to the realization of ESR. Eight General Comments contain discrete chapters or sections explicitly addressing "obligations of actors other than states," 47 as well as a wide range of references to private/ nonstate actors that demonstrate that privatization is very much part of accepted delivery methods of ESR. 48 The Committee has made clear in several General Comments the need for states to build a consideration of collaboration with private actors, and hence implicitly privatization, into what it has termed "framework laws" for the operationalization of ESR. 49 In its General Comment No. 4 on the Right to Adequate Housing, for example, the Committee stated that [m] easures designed to satisfy a State party's obligations in respect of the right to adequate housing may reflect whatever mix of public and private sector measures considered appropriate. While in some States public financing of housing might most usefully be spent on direct construction of new housing, in most cases, experience has shown the inability of Governments to fully satisfy housing deficits with publicly built housing. The promotion by States parties of "enabling strategies," combined with a full commitment to obligations under the right to adequate housing, should thus be encouraged. In essence, the obligation is to demonstrate that, in aggregate, the measures being taken are sufficient to 47 realize the right for every individual in the shortest possible time in accordance with the maximum of available resources.
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That said, the Committee has made clear its awareness of the potential negative implications of privatization for ESR enjoyment: emphasizing in its General Comment No. 22 on the Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health, for instance, that international assistance should not "push recipient countries to adopt models of privatization." 51 In other General Comments, the Committee's concerns about the implications of privatization for equality and nondiscrimination in terms of ESR enjoyment are evident; examples include a statement in relation to the rights of persons with disabilities that "[i]n a context in which arrangements for the provision of public services are increasingly being privatized and in which the free market is being relied on to an ever greater extent, it is essential that private employers, private suppliers of goods and services, and other non-public entities be subject to both non-discrimination and equality norms," 52 and highlighting that the obligation of states to monitor and regulate the conduct of nonstate actors to ensure that they do not violate the equal right of men and women to enjoy economic, social, and cultural rights applies "in cases where public services have been partially or fully privatized." 53 Despite these comments, the Committee has not engaged with privatization forms, processes, outputs, outcomes, and rights impacts in depth in its General Comments or other work. While there are a number of questions directed towards states parties related to privatization in its reporting guidelines, 54 In the absence of government intervention there will always be instances in which the operation of the free market will produce unsatisfactory results for persons with disabilities, either individually or as a group, and in such circumstances it is incumbent on Governments to step in and take appropriate measures to temper, complement, compensate for, or override the results produced by market forces. Observations appear to be largely ad hoc, 55 with recent, more consistent references focused on education reflecting the advocacy of two nongovernmental organizations on this point. 56 In his 2012 analysis of the CESCR's approach to privatization in its Concluding Observations, Antenor Hallo de Wolf found that "[t]he broad concerns of the CESCR regarding privatization are very obvious and the perceived threats with respect to the rights guaranteed in the ICESCR should be duly noted. However, the CESCR's way of dealing with privatization leaves something to be desired." 57 In none of the Concluding Observations considered by Hallo de Wolf did the Committee note how privatization affected the rights concerned; rather, it limited itself to observing that privatization may have (or has had) some type of negative effect upon the enjoyment of a right without properly evidencing these conclusions with data or specific cases. 58 The Committee's more recent work focused on the right to education has, it is true, moved beyond this somewhat, with both its questions to states on privatization and its Concluding Observations focusing on the impact of privatization on specific elements of that right. 59 There are also some signs that the Committee is beginning to adopt a similar approach in other ESR contexts. 60 There is however still very limited evidence of engagement with the specific forms and processes of privatization: key state decision-making bodies go unexamined, different models of privatization are not identified restructuring of public and private enterprises."); id. ¶ 30 ("Indicate whether the public social security schemes described above are supplemented by any private schemes or informal arrangements. If so, describe these schemes and arrangements and their interrelationship with the public schemes."); id. ¶ 48(c) ("The measures taken to ensure that water services, whether privately or publicly provided, are affordable for everyone."); id.
¶ 56(b) ("That the costs of health-care services and health insurance, whether privately or publicly provided, are affordable for everyone, including for socially disadvantaged groups." 62 There thus remained a range of unanswered questions in terms of how the ICESCR framework captures rights-harming privatization processes and actions.
In considering in more detail the ability of the ESR framework to address privatization, this section will focus on a specific albeit very important general area: the Committee's treatment of privatization in the context of the tripartite typology that it has evolved as part of its General Comments. 63 It should be noted that this is far from the only approach to ESR obligations that could be employed to consider privatization. One might, for instance, look at this phenomenon from the perspective of the state's obligations with regard to progressive realization and the use of maximum available resources in terms of Article 2(1) ICESCR. However, this has not been the dominant approach adopted by the Committee in its work on privatization and will not be our key focus here. 64 61. For instance, in its 2017 Concluding Observations on Australia, the Committee expressed concern that private companies, such as the service providers in the regional processing centers for asylum-seekers in Nauru and Papua New Guinea, were responsible for serious human rights violations, and about the lack of proper and independent investigation and complaints mechanisms. See CESCR, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of Australia, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/AUS/CO/5 (11 July 2017). It did not, however, discuss the specific arrangements or obligations at issue bar the right to a remedy in terms of Article 2(1) ICESCR. 62. CESCR, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2011/1 (20 May 2011). There is a reference to states parties being required "to obtain the corporate sector's support to the realization of economic, social and cultural rights," id. ¶ 6, in the context of a discussion of the obligation to fulfill but this is a far cry from a clear reference to privatization. The tripartite typology forms a central part of the Committee's work. It has been a feature of all General Comments on substantive rights since its 1999 one on the right to food 65 -and has served as a primary framework on the part of the Committee for the purposes of delineating obligations imposed on states, including in the context of privatization. The typology has been highly influential, being employed extensively by academics, advocates, and as will be discussed below, other UN actors in their work on ESR. As such, it is a central element of the normative ESR framework outlined by the Committee, reflecting that body's conceptualization of ESR and their corresponding obligations.
The typology has evolved over time 66 but the key elements can be summed up as follows: the obligation to respect requires states to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of ESR; 67 the obligation to protect requires states to take steps to prevent others from interfering with the enjoyment of ESR;
68 and the obligation to fulfill requires states to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional, and other measures towards the full realization of ESR. 69 Incorporating the obligations to promote, facilitate, and provide, 70 the obligation to fulfill is strongly linked with the umbrella obligation set out in Article 2(1) ICESCR of progressive realization of ESR to the maximum extent of state resources, 71 quently put it, the state's obligation to prevent "interference" by third parties with "enjoyment" of ESR. 73 In a similar vein, much of the Committee's discussion of the role of the state vis-à-vis the satisfaction of ESR-related needs by private actors has centered on the issue of the regulation of such actors-crucially again primarily in the context of discussions on the obligation to protect. 74 The Committee's most extensive statements on privatization specifically in the context of the tripartite typology have taken place in the context of "protect": for instance, the obligation to protect the right to health includes the duty to "ensure that privatization of the health sector does not constitute a threat to the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of health facilities, goods, and services;" 75 and the obligation to protect the right to work includes the duty "to ensure that privatization measures do not undermine workers' rights." 76 The biggest concern about the Committee concentrating on the obligation to protect in the context of privatization in this way is that such a focus suggests that privatization primarily involves a situation in which nonstate actors on their own initiative act in a way which negatively impacts on rights without state involvement and that this is a situation that simply calls for state intervention to prevent and address such impacts. But in reality, as discussed above, privatization involves states (and state action/inaction) directly: privatization (in the sense of situations in which states formally mandate private sector actors to provide ESR-related services) cannot occur without states making that possible, 77 albeit that, as recognized earlier, they may not be acting autonomously in exercising a decision to implement such policies. 78 As such, privatization aimed at the provision of ESR-related The heavy focus on the obligation to protect rather than fulfill is an error on the Committee's part or-at the very least-involves a failure to appreciate a key element of the full picture of privatization. The obligation to fulfill better captures the state's decision to privatize in the first place, while the obligation to protect, with its focus on the protection of existing enjoyment of rights, centers on addressing problems in the context of a status quo of privatization. 80 Considering privatization from the perspective of the obligation to fulfill will have implications for the identification and evaluation of state measures to be taken in the context of privatization. Admittedly, many of the steps required to ensure that the state complies with its obligation to fulfill ESR in the context of privatization may be very similar to those that have been outlined by the Committee and others in the context of the obligation to protect (e.g., ensuring the establishment and maintenance of regulatory and accountability mechanisms). However, an accurate appreciation of what is happening in privatization (and, indeed, pre-and post-privatization) situations from the perspective of the obligation to fulfill goes beyond that entailed by the obligation to protect; an "obligation to fulfill" approach will require the state to consider the compliance of privatization with ESR ab initio as a means to achieve the full realization of ESR, and will entail an engagement with the implications of privatization for the overall realization of ESR. In other words it will bring a far wider ESR obligations perspective to bear. The Committee has expressly addressed the issue of privatization specifically in the context of a discussion of the obligation to fulfill ESR on only two occasions-in its 2000 General Comment No. 14 on the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health and its 2003 General Comment No. 15 on the Right to Water, respectively. In these instances, the Committee stressed that "[f]urther obligations include the provision of a public, private or mixed health insurance system which is affordable for all" 81 and that states must ensure that water services, "whether privately or publicly provided, are affordable for all."
82 However, even both of these General Comments included much more extensive discussions of privatization in their respective sections on the obligation to protect, stating that obligations to protect include, inter alia, the duties of States to adopt legislation or to take other measures ensuring equal access to health care and health-related services provided by third parties; to ensure that privatization of the health sector does not constitute a threat to the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of health facilities, goods and services 83 and, inter alia, that [w] here water services (such as piped water networks, water tankers, access to rivers and wells) are operated or controlled by third parties, States parties must prevent them from compromising equal, affordable, and physical access to sufficient, safe and acceptable water. To prevent such abuses an effective regulatory system must be established, in conformity with the Covenant and this General The state's duty to protect against violations of human rights by nonstate actors is often raised as an argument against the need to recognize and impose direct human rights duties on nonstate actors. The duty to protect enjoins the state to act positively to regulate, to prevent, and to remedy interferences by nonstate actors. In the context of the right to water, the state duty to protect would require the state to "regulate private interactions to ensure that individuals are not arbitrarily deprived of the enjoyment of their right to water by other private individuals" and groups. As noted in the previous section [of the article], the involvement of the private sector in water delivery can give rise to a range of human rights concerns, making the state's protective duty essential.
(Footnotes omitted) (quoting MaTThew craven, The inTernaTional covenanT on econoMic, social, anD culTural riGhTs: a perspecTive on iTs DevelopMenT 112 (1995)). The work of Anton Kok writing in the context of the right to access to sufficient water under the South African Constitution provides an exception to the general failure to pay attention to the "fulfill" (and indeed "respect") obligation imposed by the right to water. light of it." States adopt privatization models as part of their overall efforts to ultimately achieve full realization of ESR; to the extent that the obligation to protect arises, it does so after the initial decision to privatize has been taken-and that initial decision to privatize has ESR obligation implications as well. De Feyter and Gómez Isa state that the State cannot absolve itself of its international human rights obligations by delegating service delivery to private actors. The State remains responsible under human rights treaties even if the relevant service has been privatised. . . . The actions that the State will need to undertake at the domestic level in order to avoid a breach of its human rights obligations do change, however. . . . States will need to focus more after privatisation on the duty to provide protection against abuses by third parties, i.e., by the private actor who takes over responsibility for service provision. The State will only be able to provide protection, if it develops instruments for overseeing the human rights impact of service delivery by the private actor, and for stepping in when human rights are abused.
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While De Feyter and Gómez Isa are certainly correct that "[u]pfront attention to the maintenance of regulatory capacity after privatisation is essential," 90 this upfront attention should also be considered as part of the obligation to fulfill not just of the obligation to protect. Writing in the area of the right to education, Fons Coomans and Hallo de Wolf note that "[i]n the area of privatisation, the general state duty to protect seems to be particularly relevant, because the state has to ensure that the right to education is fully enjoyed by learners once private bodies take care of educational services." 91 89. Id. at 3. It should be noted that there are a number of major problems with the definition of the different elements of the typology outlined by De Feyter and Gómez Isa in this work, with the view being expressed that the obligation to respect relates to "rights for which people can self-provide" and the obligation to fulfill the right "when people are unable to self-provide." This is not consistent with the Committee's delineation of these obligations in any of its General Comments. Ironically, those authors' treatment of the obligation to protect as a duty "to offer protection against abuse by third parties" is much closer to the Committee's contemporary approach to that obligation than at the time at which they were writing. 90. Id. at 4.
Fons Coomans & Antenor Hallo de Wolf, Privatisation of Education and the Right to
Education, in privaTisaTion anD huMan riGhTs in The aGe of GlobalisaTion, supra note 7, at 229, 239 (emphasis added). Interestingly from the perspective of the discussion in this article, Coomans and Hallo de Wolf proceed to state that "decisions to start privatisation in the sphere of education . . . should from a human rights perspective, not increase inequality in society, but rather contribute to a better realisation of the right to education for vulnerable groups." Id. at 240. They note further that "a state has an obligation to respect existing levels of protection, or put differently, to abstain from measures that would reduce the extent to which the right to education is guaranteed at a given moment." Id. This understanding of the obligations of the state would seem to bring in elements of the obligations to respect and fulfill ESR-but Coomans and Hallo de Wolf do not explore or even refer to those obligations in this section of the work, albeit that they do recognize towards the end of the same piece that if privatization policies endanger the requirements of the availability, accessibility, adaptability, and acceptability of education, "the state has a duty to abstain from these measures (in other words, the state has an obligation to respect the enjoyment of the right to education)." Id. at 253.
Another problem with focusing on the obligation to protect is that that obligation has historically been addressed by the CESCR primarily in terms of preventing and addressing "interference" with ESR enjoyment by third parties. 92 This has implications for the Committee's capacity to deal with privatization-caused ESR harm that is not attributable to "interference." Even where the Committee has addressed situations where ESR-related delivery systems are operated or controlled by third parties, much of the focus in the Committee's obligation to protect jurisprudence in its General Comments is essentially reactive: with states apparently being required to ensure that such parties do not compromise existing enjoyment of, or access to, ESRrelated goods and services rather than being required to consider in detail the rights compliance of the permitting of such control (and the determination of appropriate parameters of such control) in the first place. In instances in which the Committee makes clear that states must ensure that privatization does not "constitute a threat to," interfere with or undermine the availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality of ESR-related facilities, goods, and services, 93 the language used by the Committee seems to suggest that such availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality of such facilities, goods, and services is the default position, with privatization potentially operating against this. While this may just be a question of a poor choice of language, the effect of its use is that there is a failure to engage with privatization as a positive state choice involving the enabling (and in some instances the incentivization) of third parties, as opposed to something that arises organically and in relation to which the state's chief role is reactive. This approach would be unproblematic on occasions in which privatization is also dealt with elsewhere in its discussion of the tripartite typology, as was the case in the Committee's General Comment No. 14 on the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health discussed above; 94 where this does not occur, there is a clear gap in terms of the decision-making and processes at a key stage of privatization. This is thus an example of a substantive way in which the (mis)characterization of privatization in the context of the typology operates to reduce the scope of human rights protection in the context of privatization.
It is not accurate to say, as Sharmila Murthy does, that "[a]n inverse relationship exists between the protect and fulfill prongs: The more a state delegates its responsibilities to fulfill to a non-state actor, the greater its duty 13, supra note 47, ¶ 50: ("[A] State must . . . protect the accessibility of education by ensuring that third parties, including parents and employers, do not stop girls from going to school."); CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 47, ¶ 35 ("Obligations to protect include, inter alia, the duties of States . . . to ensure that privatization of the health sector does not constitute a threat to the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of health facilities, goods and services."); CESCR General Comment No. 15, supra note 47, ¶ 24 ("Where water services (such as piped water networks, water tankers, access to rivers and wells) are operated or controlled by third parties, States parties must prevent them from compromising equal, affordable, and physical access to sufficient, safe and acceptable water."); CESCR General Comment No. 18, supra note 47, ¶ 25 ("Obligations to protect the right to work include, inter alia, the duties of States parties to adopt legislation or to take other measures ensuring equal access to work and training and to ensure that privatization measures do not undermine workers' rights."); CESCR General Comment No. 19, supra note 47, ¶ 46 ("Where social security schemes, whether contributory or non-contributory, are operated or controlled by third parties, States parties retain the responsibility of administering the national social security system and ensuring that private actors do not compromise equal, adequate, affordable, and accessible social security."); CESCR General Comment No. 22, supra note 51, ¶ 42:
The duty to protect requires States to put in place and implement laws and policies prohibiting conduct by third parties that causes harm to physical and mental integrity or undermines the full enjoyment of the right to sexual and reproductive health, including the conduct of private health-care facilities . . . This includes the prohibition of violence and discriminatory practices, such as the exclusion of particular individuals or groups from the provision of sexual and reproductive health services.
Id. ¶ 60 ("States must effectively monitor and regulate specific sectors, such as private health-care providers . . . to ensure that they do not undermine or violate enjoyment by individuals of the right to sexual and reproductive health."). 94. See generally in the context of the Committee's General Comments on the right to health and the right to water, supra note 47.
to protect"; 95 while the state may delegate its responsibilities, (in the sense of its operational responsibilities) and increase the scope of activity required of it in terms of the obligation to protect, its obligation to fulfill in terms of IHRL remains as extensive as before. The use of privatization does not make the obligation to fulfill merely "default"-applying only where there is no nonstate actor involvement. Rather, the obligation to fulfill is directly implicated in terms of the state's decision to privatize in the first place, the form that any such privatization arrangement takes, and in assessing the success of that arrangement(s) in terms of advancing or undermining the overall realization of ESR. These stages or loci of decision-making are not captured effectively where the key prism for the Committee's analysis is the obligation to protect, given the Committee's historic emphasis on "interference" rather than the wide range of ways in which nonstate actors can affect ESR-both positively and negatively-in a privatization context. While the obligation to fulfill underpins and is relevant at all times during privatization processes, the obligation to protect (as traditionally conceptualized by the Committee and reflected in the work of Henry Shue, Asbjørn Eide, and others which served as the basis of the Committee's approach) 96 primarily comes into play in an ESR context where actors that have been mandated to carry out functions related to ESR goods and service delivery (and, as explained earlier, this article is only looking at situations in which there has been such formal mandating) operate in such a way as to threaten or damage existing rights enjoyment; for instance, where private entities hike tariffs beyond the level of affordability resulting in an interference with preexisting levels of rights enjoyment. It is not engaged when such actors fail to advance enjoyment of ESR (which would relate to the obligation to fulfill 95 and the overarching obligation of progressive realization under Article 2(1) ICESCR). If we consider a situation in which privatization does not interfere with (aka reduce/negatively impact on) the enjoyment of ESR that pertained prior to privatization, then that would seem to be unobjectionable from the perspective of the obligation to protect; the fact that such privatization did not in fact result in the state advancing in terms of ESR realization would not be an issue. However, from the perspective of the obligation to fulfill, where the emphasis is on positive measures directed towards the goal of full realization, it is strongly questionable whether such maintenance of the status quo would be sufficient. Certainly it would not be in terms of the Article 2(1) ICESCR obligation of progressive realization unless the state could point to other, complementary measures ensuring that the state was moving towards the goal of full realization of ESR "as expeditiously and effectively as possible." 97 When privatization is considered from the perspective of the obligation to fulfill, the Committee would be expected to consider such activity in light of the constituent elements of the obligation to fulfill: the duties to facilitate, promote, and provide. Questions to be asked about privatization pre, during, and post the privatization process would include: Would or does the privatization arrangement in question enable and assist individuals and communities to enjoy the ESR in question (i.e., would or does it facilitate that ESR)? Would or does privatization result in increased education about or public awareness of the ESR in question (i.e., would or does it promote that ESR)? Would or does privatization result in provision of the relevant ESR to those who cannot realize that right themselves by the means at their disposal (i.e., would or does it provide that ESR)?
98 These questions would be posed so as to assess the extent to which the state conceptualizes and employs privatization so as to advance ESR enjoyment, in light of the ultimate goal of ICESCR-specified by Article 2(1) as the full realization of ESR.
97. CESCR General Comment No. 3, supra note 6, ¶ 9. I am not suggesting that progressive realization in terms of Article 2(1) directly corresponds to the obligation to fulfill. However, there is undoubtedly a close relationship between the two as conceptualized by the Committee, and the obligation to fulfill plays an important role in terms of crystallizing state duties in the context of state efforts to ensure increased rights enjoyment as envisaged by the obligation of progressive realization in Article 2(1). 98. These questions are based on the language employed by the Committee in delineating the obligation to fulfill in a range of its General Comments. The typology was introduced in General Comment No. 12. It was only in General Comment No. 14, that the constituent element of the duty to "promote" was added to the duties to facilitate and provide outlined in General Comments Nos. 12, 13. See CESCR General Comment No. 12, supra note 65; CESCR General Comment No. 13, supra note 47; CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 47.
B. A Similar Picture from (Sometimes) a Different Angle? The Work of the Other UN Treaty-Monitoring Bodies on ESR and Privatization
Moving beyond the CESCR to look at other treaty-monitoring bodies with an ESR mandate, it is evident that even the relatively limited engagement of the CESCR with privatization is more developed than that of the four UN Committees assessing ESR implementation from the perspectives of race, disability, migrant workers, and gender equality. None of these bodies have progressed further than the CESCR in terms of addressing the forms, processes, outputs, and outcomes of privatization-or in detailing the specific negative rights impacts of such-in their General Comments/Recommendations, or their Day of General Discussions/Thematic Discussion recommendations.
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The Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination has made clear that private actors can have a role in creating and exacerbating discrimination in terms of ESR enjoyment, 100 in particular education, 101 without however engaging with privatization to any meaningful extent. The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has also focused on the impact of private actors in relation to education-specifically inclusive education-stating that "States parties must ensure that persons with disabilities are able to access education in both public and private academic institutions on an equal basis with others." 102 In doing so, that body emphasized that the obligation to protect "requires taking measures that prevent third parties from interfering with the enjoyment of the right, for example . . . private institutions refusing to enroll persons with disabilities on the basis of their impairment," but also highlighted that the obligation to fulfill "requires taking 99. Hallo de Wolf has noted that:
The UN's human rights treaty bodies approach has in general acknowledged privatization as a measure that States may adopt, but which may sometimes have negative effects on the enjoyment of human rights. However, it is not always clear on which basis some of the treaty bodies come to the conclusion that privatization may have detrimental consequences for human rights, or under which particular conditions this may happen.
measures that enable and assist persons with disabilities to enjoy the right to education, for example, ensuring that educational institutions are accessible and that education systems are adapted appropriately with resources and services." 103 This presumably applies to private education systems and thus constitutes an implicit engagement with privatization. The Committee's focus on ensuring accessibility of ESR-related goods and services, including those that are privatized, is a repeated theme in its work, with it making clear that [t] he focus is no longer on legal personality and the public or private nature of those who own buildings, transport infrastructure, vehicles, information and communication, and services. As long as goods, products and services are open or provided to the public, they must be accessible to all, regardless of whether they are owned and/or provided by a public authority or a private enterprise. . . . This approach stems from the prohibition against discrimination; denial of access should be considered to constitute a discriminatory act, regardless of whether the perpetrator is a public or private entity.
104
Unfortunately from the perspective of the tripartite typology, the Committee has also demonstrated a somewhat confused understanding of the different elements of the typology in the context of private action. For instance, in its General Comment No. 5 on Living Independently and Being Supported in the Community, it stated that the "positive aspect" of the obligation to respect requires states to take "all necessary measures to ensure that no rights enshrined in article 19 are violated by the State or by private entities." 105 In doing so, the Committee appeared to conflate the obligations to respect and protect-despite its extensive discussion of the latter obligation elsewhere in that General Comment.
106
The Committee on Migrant Workers has also addressed the risks posed to migrant workers and their families from privatization, highlighting the "particular difficulties" posed by privately run migrant detention centers in terms of monitoring, as well as making clear that "administrative detention of migrant workers should, as a rule, take place in public establishments" and that "States parties cannot absolve themselves of their human rights obligations by contracting out the detention of persons to private commercial enterprises. on the Rights of the Child emphasized the role of private providers in the context of the right to an adequate standard of living, stating that "[s]tates should develop procedures and standards to establish firewalls between public or private service providers, including public or private housing providers, and immigration enforcement authorities." 108 The Committee on Migrant Workers has not, however, explicitly engaged with the tripartite typology in a privatization context.
The Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) has made only relatively limited reference to privatization, despite the reference in Article 2(e) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women to states parties' obligation "to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise."
109 The Committee's first use of the word "privatization" in its General Recommendations occurred in 2016: in its General Recommendation No. 34 on the Rights of Rural Women, it stated that states parties "should address the negative and differential impacts of economic policies, including . . . privatization . . . on the lives of rural women and the fulfilment of their rights. Similarly, development partners should also ensure that their development assistance policies focus on the specific needs of rural women." This is however a rather confused statement-under IHRL, the obligation to respect adheres to the state, not to private healthcare providers-and if it is to be read as consistent with the understanding of that obligation, then "their duties" must be understood to refer to states, rather than providers. While privatization is not explicitly mentioned in the context of the obligation to protect, the Committee makes clear its view that that duty requires states "to take action to prevent and impose sanctions for violations of rights by private persons and organizations." 113 The most detailed statement by CEDAW in relation to privatization occurred in the context of its discussion of the obligation to fulfill in the same General Recommendation, where it expressed its concern about the evidence that States are relinquishing these obligations as they transfer State health functions to private agencies. States and parties cannot absolve themselves of responsibility in these areas by delegating or transferring these powers to private sector agencies. States parties should therefore report on what they have done to organize governmental processes and all structures through which public power is exercised to promote and protect women's health. They should include information on positive measures taken to curb violations of women's rights by third parties and to protect their health and the measures they have taken to ensure the provision of such services.
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Despite this, when it came to delineating the core obligations of states parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in its General Recommendation No. 28 on this topic, obligations vis-à-vis preventing discrimination by private actors were only addressed in relation to the obligation to protect. 115 Elsewhere in the General Recommendation, CEDAW highlighted the need for states to prevent and address discrimination in both the private and public spheres in such a way as to make it evident it applied to situations of privatization.
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Furthermore-and again not in the context of its discussion of the typology-in outlining the state's "due diligence" obligation (generally associated with the obligation to protect) 117 which operates to prevent discrimination by private actors being attributed to the state, CEDAW highlighted that the "appropriate measures that States parties are obliged to take include the regulation of the activities of private actors with regard to education, employment and health policies and practices, working conditions and work standards, and other areas in which private actors provide services or facilities, such as banking and housing." 118 A similar approach is evident in the Committee's later work with regard to private actors empowered by state law "to exercise elements of governmental authority, including private bodies providing public services, such as health care or education." 119 Again this can be understood as a UN treaty-monitoring body outlining obligation to protect-related measures in the context of status quo privatization.
The Committee's November 2017 General Recommendation on the Right of Girls and Women to Education, engaged head-on with privatization, stressing the link between the outsourcing of education to non-state actors and economic crises. 120 In a particularly strident statement, it noted that "privatization has specific negative consequences for girls and women, and in particular girls from poorer families, namely, their exclusion from education" and urged states to take a range of actions to ensure that user fees and hidden costs (and implicitly those imposed where education is provide by private actors) do not have a negative impact on girls' and women's access to education. 121 It did not, however, locate its discussion of privatization in the context of the tripartite typology. This is in contrast to the Committee's discussion of public-private partnerships in its subsequent General Recommendation where it said that states should "adopt regulatory measures to protect women from human rights violations caused by private business actors and ensure that their own activities, including those conducted in partnership with the private sector and civil society, respect and protect human rights." 122 Ultimately, what emerges from the practice of these Committees, as with the CESCR, is an underlying concern with the impact of private actors but with limited consideration, with the notable exception of CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24, being given to how privatization engages with different elements of the tripartite typology.
Beyond the CESCR, the UN treaty-monitoring body that has so far focused on the issue of privatization to the greatest extent is the Committee on the Rights of the Child (ComRC). Here we see a very different story involving UN treaty body engagement with these issues to the one we have so far been telling. The ComRC has made it clear that private actors and privatization arrangements can play a role in "the provision and management of services such as clean water, sanitation, education, transport, health, alternative care, energy, security and detention facilities that are critical to the enjoyment of children's rights." 123 However, it has also recognized that the process of privatization of services can have a serious impact on the recognition and realization of children's rights and has highlighted standards that privatization processes must meet. 124 The Committee's concern with "the high relevance" of the "assumption by non-governmental organizations or businesses of traditional State functions" to its work resulted in a Day of General Discussion (DGD) in 2002. 125 The aims of the day placed the "direct and indirect" impacts of privatization arrangements on the "full realization"
126 of the rights of the child front and center, with participants agreeing that Article 4 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)-the umbrella obligation of the CRC which requires states to "undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures for the implementation of the rights" 127 -was a "fundamental provision to be considered by States parties when dealing with non-State service providers." 128 A stated goal of the DGD was the specification of obligations of states in the context of privatization "in terms of positive obligations, ensuring non-discrimination with regard to access, equitable and affordable access, especially for marginalized groups, as well as assuring quality and sustainability of service provision." 129 Furthermore, obligations "with respect to the regulation and monitoring of the activities of the private sector, including the adoption of a rights-based approach to service provision, [would] be specified." 130 The Chair of the Committee at the time highlighted in particular the "growing trend of privatization, including in the provision of services addressing basic needs, including health, education and water" and noted that this gave rise to "a lot of questions which are difficult and complex and had not yet been fully addressed. In fact, these questions had never been addressed by a human rights treaty body before" 131 -a statement which could be taken as a less-than-subtle sideswipe at the CESCR. Article 3(1) establishes that the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private bodies. Article 3(3) requires the establishment of appropriate standards by competent bodies (bodies with the appropriate legal competence), in particular, in the areas of health, and with regard to the number and suitability of staff. This requires rigorous inspection to ensure compliance with the Convention.
134. Id. ¶ 43. It should be noted that it is unclear how the imposition of a duty on the state to ensure that nonstate actors act in accordance with the CRC's provisions gives rise to "indirect obligations" on those nonstate actors. 135. This is consistent with other duties and responsibilities of nonstate actors identified in terms of the CRC, for instance those of parents and legal guardians of the child. interests of the child are central to the development of legislation and policies that shape business activities and operations, such as those relating to . . . privatization."
140 Furthermore, while stressing that the Committee does not prescribe the form of delivery of ESR-related (and other rights-related) services, it emphasized that states are not exempted from their obligations under the CRC when they outsource or privatize services that impact on the fulfillment of children's rights. Engaging expressly with the tripartite typology, the Committee reiterated that states are not relieved of their obligations under the Convention and its protocols when their functions are delegated or outsourced. 141 In doing so, it highlighted that the obligation to respect "means that States should not directly or indirectly facilitate, aid and abet any infringement of children's rights"; furthermore, states have the obligation to ensure that all actors respect children's rights, including in the context of business activities and operations.
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Perhaps unsurprisingly given what we have seen in terms of the other treaty-monitoring bodies' practice (but disappointingly from the perspective of the tripartite typology-related arguments being made in this article and from the relatively expansive nature of the comments we have seen it has been willing to make), the Committee emphasized that the obligation to protect is of "primary importance" when considering states' obligations with regards to the business sector (which admittedly go beyond privatization) and made clear that it requires states to take all "necessary, appropriate and reasonable measures to prevent business enterprises from causing or contributing to abuses of children's rights."
143 According to the Committee, such measures can encompass "the passing of law and regulation, their monitoring and enforcement, and policy adoption that frame how business enterprises can impact on children's rights."
144 The Committee's statements in relation to the obligation to protect did not refer to privatization specifically and, when delineating what specific measures this level of obligation requires, it focused very much on the creation of an effective legal framework of a regulatory nature.
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When looking at state obligations in the context of the provision of services for children's rights, 146 -a requirement that can be viewed as relating to both protect and fulfill. The Committee also made clear that states "must ensure that such provision does not threaten children's access to services on the basis of discriminatory criteria, especially under the principle of protection from discrimination." 149 In terms of remedies for violations of rights in the context of privatization and more broadly, ("for all service sectors") 150 children must be provided with access to an independent monitoring body, complaints mechanisms, and, where relevant, to recourse to the courts. Building on its earlier General Comment No. 5, the Committee recommended that "there should be a permanent monitoring mechanism or process aimed at ensuring that all non-State service providers have in place and apply policies, programmes and procedures which are in compliance with the Convention."
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While these are the key instances in which the Committee has expressed its views on privatization, it has also touched on the issue in its work on early childhood, where it devoted a section of a General Comment to "the private sector as service provider"; 152 157 In its General Comment No. 14 on the Right of the Child to Have His or Her Best Interests Taken as a Primary Consideration, the Committee made clear that "private social welfare institutions" for the purposes of the application of the best interests principles set out in Article 3(1), include "private sector organizations-either for-profit or non-profit-which play a role in the provision of services that are critical to children's enjoyment of their rights, and which act on behalf of or alongside Government services as an alternative." 158 What emerges from this analysis is a Committee that has seriously considered the way in which privatization raises concerns from the perspective of a range of different obligations and recognizes that privatization is not simply a question of the control of independent third parties that interfere with children's rights enjoyment on their own initiative but relates directly to state choices about the full implementation of children's rights. While the Committee did not expressly link privatization with any of the levels of the typology, it made clear through its general language when outlining each element of the typology that privatization could fall under any or all of them rather than narrowly explicitly or implicitly restricting consideration of privatization-related issues to the obligation to protect. This holistic understanding of the ESR implications of privatization is a significant advance on the narrow, "obligation to protect" focused approach historically adopted by the CESCR and the even looser analysis of the other bodies that we have discussed. The approach of the ComRC demonstrates the truth of Sandra Liebenberg's observation that a complex matrix of duties are applicable in a state-undertaken privatization program and that, on that basis, the conception of the legal framework under IHRL cannot be limited to just one set of duties. 159 In contrast, the CESCR's primary focus on the state's duties as indirectly horizontal in terms of the obligation to protect at the expense of the state's direct vertical obligations in terms of the obligation to fulfill means that it fails to appreciate the multiple ways in which state obligations are engaged at different stages and in different contexts of privatization.
V. A NEW DAWN FOR PRIVATIZATION AND ESR?
Much of this article has been highly critical of the CESCR's performance with regard to addressing ESR-related measures and harms related to privatization in terms of the tripartite typology. While privatization is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon, the Committee's failure to adequately conceptualize it in terms of the different elements of the typology (and indeed ESR obligations more broadly) severely restricts the ability of state actors, ESR advocates and others to ensure that privatization is ESR-compliant. It is thus fitting to conclude by considering the Committee's most recent and extensive discussion of privatization, which takes place in its General Comment No. 24, issued in June 2017, on State Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context of Business Activities.
160 Does this recent intervention mark a turning point in the Committee's approach to the issue?
The ground may be shifting to some extent so far as the tripartite structure and the Committee's approach to privatization is concerned. From an obligations perspective, it is striking that the Committee provides an understanding of the obligation to protect that is quite different to that in its earlier work, and much broader:
The obligation to protect means that States parties must prevent effectively infringements of economic, social and cultural rights in the context of business activities. This requires that States parties adopt legislative, administrative, educational and other appropriate measures, to ensure effective protection against Covenant rights violations linked to business activities, and that they provide victims of such corporate abuses with access to effective remedies. 161 By moving away from the traditional understanding of the obligation to protect that focuses on third party interference with ESR enjoyment to extend it to a duty "to prevent the infringements of economic, social and cultural rights in the context of business activities," the Committee would appear to have extended the scope of state obligation envisaged under the obligation to protect discussed above. The breadth of the obligation to protect is also made clear in the Committee's statement that states would violate their duty to protect Covenant rights "by failing to prevent or to counter conduct by businesses that leads to such rights being abused, or that has the foreseeable effect of leading to such rights being abused, for instance." catch-all for all state duties related to nonstate actors, even where the actions outlined by the Committee could be viewed as correlated to the obligation to fulfill as well, and perhaps even more suitably linked to that duty. One example of this is the Committee's statement that "States thus retain at all times the obligation to regulate private actors to ensure that the services they provide are accessible to all, are adequate, are regularly assessed in order to meet the changing needs of the public and are adapted to those needs." 163 Another is the Committee's view of the obligation to protect as entailing more "direct regulation and intervention" 164 in terms of which states are urged to consider measures such as restricting marketing and advertising of certain goods and services in order to protect public health . . . combating gender role stereotyping and discrimination; exercising rent control in the private housing market as required for the protection of everyone's right to adequate housing; establishing minimum wage [sic] consistent with a living wage and a fair remuneration; regulating other business activities concerning the Covenant rights to education, employment, and reproductive health, in order to combat gender discrimination effectively; and gradually eliminating informal or "non-standard" (i.e., precarious) forms of employment, which often result in denying the workers concerned the protection of labour laws and social security. 165 These measures are also pertinent from the perspective of the obligation to fulfill ESR -as is the Committee's later statement that private providers "should be prohibited from denying access to affordable and adequate services, treatments or information." 166 Consistently with its earlier practice, the Committee makes clear that the obligation to protect is the key one from a privatization perspective (and indeed in the context of ESR and business activities more generally) 167 by including a statement in the "obligation to protect" section of the General Comment referring to privatization, stating that [t] he increased role and impact of private actors in traditionally public sectors, such as in the health or education sectors, pose new challenges for States parties in complying with their obligations under the Covenant. Privatization is not per se prohibited by the Covenant even in areas such as the provision of water or electricity, education or healthcare where the role of the public sector has traditionally been strong. Private providers should, however, be subject to strict regulations that impose on them so-called "public service obligations": in the provision of water or electricity, this may include requirements concern- ing universality of coverage and the continuity of the service, pricing policies, quality requirements, and user participation. 168 In outlining the challenges posed for states parties with regard to complying with their Covenant obligations by the increased role and impact of private actors in what used to be predominantly public sectors, the Committee highlighted its concern that "goods and services that are necessary for the enjoyment of basic economic, social and cultural rights may become less affordable as a result of such goods and services being provided by the private sector, or that quality may be sacrificed for the sake of increasing profits." 169 It emphasized that the provision by private actors of goods and services essential for the enjoyment of Covenant rights should not lead to the enjoyment of Covenant rights being made conditional on the ability to pay, thus creating new forms of socio-economic segregation, and that, given that privatization of the delivery of goods or services essential to the enjoyment of Covenant rights may result in a lack of accountability, "measures should be adopted to ensure the right of individuals to participate in assessing the adequacy of the provision of such goods and services."
170 Here again though we can see that despite their framing as part of the obligation to protect, these challenges and the required state responses to them have a direct bearing on the obligation to fulfill ESR.
In outlining examples of violations of the obligation to protect, the Committee highlighted several privatization-related ones, including a failure to incorporate a requirement linked to reasonable accommodation of persons with disabilities in public contracts and the exemption of certain projects or certain geographical areas from the application of laws that protect Covenant rights. 171 It also raised the implications of state failure to regulate the real estate market and the financial actors operating on this market "so as to ensure access to affordable and adequate housing for all."
172 Once more it is quite possible, indeed perhaps even more plausible, to consider these as measures inherent in the obligation to fulfill in situations in which it is future, expanded enjoyment rather than existing enjoyment of rights that is at issue. The Committee's apparent ongoing intention that the obligation to protect do all the heavy lifting on privatization is also evidenced by the fact that the section of the General Comment on remedies opens with the statement that "[i]n discharging their duty to protect, States Parties should both create appropriate regulatory and policy frameworks and enforce such frameworks." 173 There is, however, no reason to suggest that state obligations with regard to remedies emanate solely from that level of obligation. It is important to note that the duty to fulfill is not entirely missing. In a section devoted to it, the Committee says that it "may require seeking business cooperation and support to implement the Covenant rights and comply with other human rights standards and principles"-while privatization is not mentioned by name, it clearly comes within the understanding of "cooperation and support." 174 And, in a move that is very welcome in terms of the criticisms made in this article, the Committee flags that the obligation to fulfill "also requires directing the efforts of business entities towards the fulfillment of Covenant rights."
175 However, this point, which signifies a potentially important development in terms of the Committee's engagement with privatization beyond the obligation to protect, is explored no further; as a result, the potential of the obligation to fulfill with regard to privatization goes unrealized.
Ultimately, therefore, the General Comment is a missed chance for the Committee to engage with the issue of privatization in a holistic way, teasing it out as an issue in light of the three elements of the typology, rather than trying to place different rights-troubling elements of privatization under the different typology headings-an exercise that will inevitably be artificial given the overlap between actions required in terms of the different levels of obligation and the fact that privatization may have implications for all three. The obligations to respect and fulfill also have implications for how the state engages with, enables, supervises, regulates, and punishes rights-harming violators and processes. This needs to be recognized if the full obligationrelated implications of privatization are to be addressed. By adopting a largely "business as usual" approach, the Committee perpetuates its inadequate conceptualization of privatization, state (in)action, and the scope of state obligations. It also appears to involve an unnecessary reconceptualization of the obligation to protect in order to address an issue that the obligation to fulfill could already deal with, thereby straining the former while stripping the latter of key meaning in the privatization context.
There is, however, a significant novel element of the Committee's work that raises a "new frontier" in terms of capturing privatization-caused rights harm with regard to ESR from a state-centric perspective which must be considered here. This is the potential designation of a rights-harming nonstate actor as an "organ of state" on the basis that it is "acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, [ Committee's failure to engage with privatization meaningfully thus far in its Concluding Observations, as well as its necessarily limited capacity given the other demands on its time, there is inevitably concern about how soon these questions will be answered. Admittedly, it is open to question whether an inevitably limited treatment of a phenomenon as global and complex as privatization in a section of a broader General Comment could serve to "cure" the CESCR's inadequate approach to that phenomenon so far. It is a shame, however, that while General Comment No. 24 undoubtedly expands upon the Committee's previous treatment of privatization, it arguably does so by "reinventing the wheel" of the obligation to protect and without the in-depth analysis of the different stages or loci of decision-making and forms of state action and inaction that a comprehensive treatment of privatization and ESR would entail. Overall, it is a pity to see an added layer of complexity in terms of the Committee's work in the form of its incorporation of the organ of state/governmental accountability doctrines when key questions about the relationship between privatization and its existing, well-established frameworks of obligation such as the tripartite typology remain outstanding.
183 This is particularly so given the influence of the Committee on the ESR and privatization work of the other international human rights bodies with an ESR mandate. In light of past practice, there is a significant risk that those bodies that have a less evolved approach to privatization and ESR-i.e., the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the CEDAW, the Committee on Migrant Workers, and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilitieswill follow it uncritically, thereby rendering their work on privatization less coherent and more question-begging. 184 There may be a natural temptation 183 . In this regard, for example, it is strongly arguable that the Committee could and should have used the General Comment as an opportunity to consider more closely the relationship between privatization and the Article 2(1) ICESCR requirement that states progressively realize ESR to the maximum extent of their available resources. As noted above, the linkages between privatization and this provision have not yet been the subject of in-depth Committee consideration, despite the centrality of Article 2(1) obligations to ICESCR. A consideration of that relationship is beyond the scope of this article but this should not be taken to suggest that the author does not regard it as important. 
